ECON 451: Public Choice
Professor Peter Coughlin

Social Choice Correspondences

Our main references are:

1) Social Choice Theory: An Introduction, by Jerry S. Kelly
a) "Chapter 2 - The Voting Paradox"
From "One central idea ..." at the beginning of the 2nd paragraph on page 15 through
"... being chosen." at the end of the 2nd sentence in the 2nd paragraph on page 16
b) "Chapter 5 - Other Voting Extensions"
c) "Chapter 10 - Strategy-Proofness"
i) From the beginning of Ch. 10 on page 101 through "...all alternatives." in the
8th-to-last line on p. 102.
ii) From "Now go back..." at the beginning of the 1st full paragraph on p. 103 through
"...in each box." in the 6th-to-last line on p. 105.
iii) From "With three alternatives..." in the 5th line of the 1st paragraph after Figure 10-17
on p. 116 through "...strategy-proofness." in the 5th line on p. 117

2) Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2^nd edition, by Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano
a) From "In the last..." in the 1st line on p. 299 through "...a foolproof SCF?" in the
11th-to-last line on p. 300.
b) "Borda's Method" (From the 2nd-to-last sentence of p. 302 through the end of the
2^nd paragraph on p. 304).
c) From “In example 3..." in the last line of the 2nd paragraph on p. 304 through "...all
requirements." in the 2nd line on p. 310.

3) Mathematics and Politics, 2^nd edition, by A. Taylor and A. Pacelli.
a) DEFINITION of a "social choice procedure" on p. 3.
b) All of section 1.3 (on pp. 5-10).
c) All of the material in sections 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 (on pp. 10-28) except the material on monotonicity.
d) From "2 x 2 ordinal ..." in the 1st line of Section 4.2 (on p. 113) through the end of the second DEFINITION on p. 116.
e) From the beginning of Section 7.5 on p. 222 through the end of the Theorem stated on p. 225.

4) Incentives, 2^nd edition, by Donald E. Campbell
a) From the beginning of Section 5 (on p. 30) through the end of Subsection 5.2 (on p. 33).
b) From the top of p. 385 through "...placed on individual preference" right before section 1.3 on p. 396.
c) From the problem set on p. 400 through the end of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem on p. 405.
d) The problem set on pp. 410 & 411.

The following items are recommended readings (which are designed to supplement the main references):

Sherif El-Helaly, The Mathematics of Voting and Apportionment, Springer, 2019.

[1] Part 2 of Definition 1.1.1 on page 2;
[2] From the beginning of Section 1.3 (on page 21) through "... y one-to-one)." in the eighth line of the section;
[3] From the beginning of Subsection 1.3.1 (on page 21) through the first sentence of Definition 1.3.2 (on page 23);
[4] Part 1 of Definition 1.6.3 (on page 84);
[5] Section 1.3.5 (on pages 28-30);
[6] From the beginning of Section 1.4.1 (on page 41) through "... of course." at the end of the Note that is in the middle of page 42;

Jean Hendriks and Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, 2^nd edition, The MIT Press, 2013.
[1] Section 11.5.1, starting on p. 361 to end of section
[2] Section 11.5.2, starting on p. 363 to end of section

These items are available through Course Reserves at ELMS.